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THE WANING OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Promissory estoppel has spawned a host of controversies since its
original formulation in Section 90 of the first Restatement of Contracts
promulgated in 1932. For example, scholars divide over whether the
source of promissory estoppel liability is reliance or the promise;'
whether the typical measure of damages for a valid promissory estoppel claim is (or should be) reliance or expectancy;2 and whether
promissory estoppel evidences the ascent of the tort principle of reliance or merely confirms the predominance of traditional contract
principles in contract law today.3 Regardless of their theoretical positions, however, most scholars presume the widespread judicial applica4
tion of promissory estoppel theory.
This Note reveals that courts, rather than enthusiastically embracing promissory estoppel theory, in fact severely limit its application.
Courts' extreme reluctance to grant recovery under promissory estoppel indicates a continued adherence to traditional contract principles
of bargained-for exchange. As yet, promissory estoppel has failed to
fulfill scholars' ominous predictions of contract's last gasp.
At the same time, the waning of promissory estoppel does not
score a decisive victory for the contract principle of consent over the
tort principle of reliance. Reliance continues to exert an even greater
influence on judicial application of promissory estoppel. Moreover,
because both reliance and consent principles inform promissory estoppel doctrine, its narrowing applicability cannot give a complete,
1 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber &John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppe: Contract
Law and the "InvisibleHandshake" 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 914 (1985) (promise); Stanley D.
Henderson, PromissoryEstoppel and TraditionalContractDocrine 78 YALE L.J. 343, 364 (1969)
(reliance); Warren L. Shattuck, GratuitousPromises-ANew Writ?, 35 MicH. L. REv. 908, 944
(1937) (reliance); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The PromissoryBasis of Section 90, 101 YALE
LJ. 111, 162 (1991) (promise).
2 See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, PromissoryEstoppelDamages,16 HorsrnA L. REv. 131, 134-35
(1987) (expectancy); Benjamin F. Boyer, PromissoryEstoppek Requirements and Limitationsof
the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. Ray. 459, 487 (1950) (reliance); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative
Promises,47 U. CHI. L. Ray. 1, 32 (1979) (reliance); Farber & Matheson, supra note 1, at 909
(expectancy); Jay M. Feinman, PromissoryEstoppel andJudicialMethod, 97 HARv. L. REv. 678,
687-88 (1984) (expectancy); Warren A. Seavey, Reliance Upon GratuitousPromises or Other
Conduct 64 HARv. L. REv. 913, 926 (1951) (reliance); W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance
in ContractDamages, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 197, 217 (1990) (expectancy); Yorio & Thel, supra
note 1, at 130 (expectancy).
3 See, e.g., P.S. ATwAH, THE RIsE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAct 771-78 (1979)
(reliance principle); GRANT GILmom, THE DEATH OF CoN'RnAr 72 (1974) (reliance principle); Henderson, supranote 1, at 386 (bargain principle of contract); Yorio & Thel, supra
note 1, at 167 (promise principle of contract).
4 See, e.g., sources cited infra note 32.
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accurate picture of the relative roles of reliance and consent principles within modem contract law.
Part I discusses the general academic acceptance of promissory
estoppel as a theory of wide application. Next, Part II surveys promissory estoppel cases decided by state courts since 1981 and shows that
actual practice contradicts academic thinking. It further examines
the strict standards of scrutiny that courts impose on promissory estoppel claims. Part III then discusses the joint roles that reliance and
consent play in promissory estoppel theory. In light of the narrowing
application of promissory estoppel, Part III also analyzes the reasons
for the continued judicial adherence to traditional contract law.
I
GENERAL ACADEMIC ACCEPTANCE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

A.

Sections 90 & 139 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts

The general theory of obligation based on reliance, which has
become known as promissory estoppel, 5 did not take hold until the
twentieth century. 6 During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, courts did recognize a reliance-based theory of recovery,
but only in a few fact-specific situations, 7 such as those involving gratuitous promises to convey land,8 gratuitous bailments, 9 charitable sub-

5 The first use of the term has been attributed to Professor Williston. See Boyer, supra
note 2, at 459 (citing 1 SAMUEL WmuisrON, CoNTRAcTs § 139 (1st ed. 1920)). The term
'promissory estoppel" is derived from the term "equitable estoppel." In the early case of
Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898), the Nebraska Supreme Court invoked the
doctrine of equitable estoppel to enforce a grandfather's promise of a monetary gift upon
which the granddaughter relied by quitting work. Under equitable estoppel, reliance on a
party's representations of fact "estops" that party from establishing contrary facts. In applying this doctrine, the court held that the grandfather was "estopped" from raising the
defense of lack of consideration. Equitable estoppel, however, traditionally applies only to
a representation of existing fact rather than to a promise of future performance. Thus, the
term "promissory estoppel" has been deemed more appropriate in cases involving reliedupon promises. See E. AA FANSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 2.19, at 92 (1982).
6 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 2.19.
7 Id.
8 Courts enforced promises to convey land where the promisee moved onto the land
and made improvements in reliance on the promise. See Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759
(Kan. 1930); Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882); Roberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks, 118 A. 275
(N.J. 1922); Freeman v. Freeman, 43 N.Y. 34 (1870).
9 Courts enforced promises in gratuitous bailment cases, where the bailor delivered
its goods to the bailee, relied on the bailee's promise to secure insurance for the goods,
and suffered loss resulting from the bailee's failure to secure insurance. See Siegel v. Spear
& Co., 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923).
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scriptions, 10 and private donative promises made by family
members."
With its appearance in Section 90 of the first Restatement of Contracts,12 the doctrine of promissory estoppel gained formal recognition
as a legitimate theory of contractual obligation. 13 Although Section
90 nowhere mentioned the term "promissory estoppel," courts invoking the doctrine often referred to that section to determine the ele14
ments of a valid claim.
Section 90 of the first Restatement set forth the following core requirements: a promise, reasonably foreseeable reliance, actual inducement of reliance by the promise, and achievement ofjustice only
through enforcement of the promise. 15 These core requirements
have remained essentially intact, despite other additions to and modifications of promissory estoppel doctrine.
Because of the brevity of the original Section 90, the extent of
promissory estoppel's application was at first uncertain. 16 Courts and
scholars initially assumed that the doctrine would apply only in private
donative, not commercial, settings. 17 The second Restatement's extensive treatment of promissory estoppel, however, signaled the legal
community's more wholehearted acceptance of the doctrine. The re10 Charitable subscription cases involve a promise to donate to a charitable organization followed by the charity's reliance on that promise. See Miller v. Western College, 52
N.E. 432 (Ill. 1898); Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1927).
11 See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898). Professor Farnsworth notes that
gratuitous promises to convey land are often also made by family members. See FARNSWORTH, supranote 5, § 2.19, at 91 n.17.

12

Section 90 of the first Restatement provided the following:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
REsTATEMENT (FiRsr) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) [hereinafter FiRsT RESTATEMENT].
13 General agreement on the persuasive authority of the Restatement exists among the
legal community. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 1.8, at 25. "A restatement then can have
no other authority than as the product of men learned in the subject who have studied and

deliberated over it. It needs no other, and what could be higher?" Charles E. Clark, The
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE LJ. 643, 655 (1933).
14 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 2.19, at 93 ("[Section 90] has been the fountainhead of recovery based on reliance in this country."); Robert A. Brazener, Annotation,
PromissoryFstoppelas Basisfor Avoidance of Statute of Frauds,56 A.L.R.u3 1037, 1046 (1974)
("The source most often cited as setting forth the prerequisites for a promissory estoppel is
Restatement, Contracts § 90.").
15
16

FIRST REsTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 90.

See GnwoMRE, supra note 3, at 64. Unlike most other sections of the first Restatement,
§ 90 had no accompanying Comments and only four supporting illustrative cases. The
vague, minimal language of § 90 led Professor Gilmore to declare that "no one had any
idea what the damn thing meant." Id. at 64-65.
17 Id. at 66.
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vision of Section 9018 and the addition of Section 139,19 which permits
the application of promissory estoppel despite the writing requirment
of the Statute of Frauds, 20 vastly expanded the potential scope of
promissory liability.
Four major changes in the second Restatement's Section 90 are
worth noting because they substantially broaden the applicability of
promissory estoppel, at least in theory. First, judges may limit the
remedy "as justice requires" by awarding reliance rather than expectancy relief.21 This discretionary power encourages courts to enforce
promises for which they would otherwise hesitate to grant expectancy
relief. Second, Section 90 no longer requires that reliance be "of a
definite and substantial character." 2 2 Third, extensive comments and
illustrations indicate that promissory estoppel applies to commercial
as well as private donative contexts. 23 Finally, the new Section 90 expands the scope of liability to encompass not only promisees but also
foreseeable third-parties acting in reliance. 24 Taken together, these
modifications reflect and, in turn, further promote the academic perception of the proliferation of promissory estoppel.
Similarly, the addition of Section 139 furthered the boundaries of
promissory estoppel doctrine by providing for enforcement of reliedupon promises that fail Statute of Frauds requirements. Section 139
appears to be an extension of Comment f to Section 178 of the first
Restatement. Comment f allowed promissory estoppel to apply despite
the Statute of Frauds, but only where the promisor misrepresented
the existence of a written agreement or promised to put the agreement in writing. 25 Section 139 includes no such strict limitations.
Is

Section 90(1) of the second Restatement provides the following:

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) [hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT].
19 In nearly identical language as in § 90(1), § 139(1) provides that § 90-type
promises are enforceable "notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds." SECOND RESTATEMENT,
supra note 18, § 139(1).
20
For a summary listing of common types of contracts subject to state Statutes of
Frauds, see SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 110. For a more detailed discussion, see
LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CorTRACTS §§ 67, 68, 76, 77, 80, 82, 88
(2d ed. 1965).
21
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 90.
22

FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 90.
See, e.g., SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18,

§ 90, cmts. b & e.
For a discussion of reliance by third-parties, see SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note
18, § 90, cmt. c.
25 Comment f provided in pertinent part the following.
A misrepresentation that there has been such satisfaction [of Statute of
23

24

Frauds requirements] if substantial action is taken in reliance on the representation, precludes proof by the party who made the representation that it
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Theoretically then, Section 139 allows for the defeat of Statute of
Frauds requirements even in the absence of a misrepresentation or a
commitment to writing.2 6 This has led commentators to predict that
"[t] he express sanction of the Second Restatement... may help overcome remaining judicial fears about abrogating the Statute, and thus
could hasten a broader recognition of promissory estoppel as a device
27
for circumventing the strictures of the Statute of Frauds."
B.

Perceptions of Promissory Estoppel's Proliferation and of
Bargain Theory's Concomitant Decline

Prior to the development of promissory estoppel, the bargain theory of consideration was the unquestioned cornerstone of contract
law.2 8 Although the doctrine of consideration began as a requirement
that there be either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the
promisee, by the end of the nineteenth century it evolved into a requirement that there be a "bargained-for" exchange. 29 Thus the bargain theory of consideration posits that a promise is enforceable if it is
supported by consideration, which is "bargained-for" or, in other
words, "sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and...
given by the promisee in exchange for that promise."3 0 Furthermore,
the bargain theory of consideration requires the parties' mutual assent to be bound, as manifested by a complete and definite offer and
a corresponding acceptance of that offer.3 1
The development of promissory estoppel has since challenged
the preeminence of bargain principles of consideration and mutual
assent. In fact, courts and commentators have declared that promissory estoppel is no longer a theory of last resort, but rather a primary
basis for recovery.3 2 Adherents of this view claim that courts apply
was false; and a promise to make a memorandum, if similarly relied on, may
give rise to an effective promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise

operate to defraud.
Frusr RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 178, cmt f.
26
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 139.
27 Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of PromissoryEstoppel as an
Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RuTGERS L. REv. 472, 491 (1983).
28 See Feinman, supra note 2, at 679; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 27, at 477-78.
29 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 2.2, at 41.
30 SECOND RESrATEMENT, supra note 18, § 71. Note that the second Restatement does
not make as a requirement of consideration that there be a benefit or detriment. Id. §§ 71,
79.
31 Metzger & Phillips, supra note 27, at 476-77.
32 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); ATiYA-,

supra note 3, at 776-78; Farber & Matheson, supra note 1, at 908; Metzger & Phillips, supra
note 27, at 508-36. See alsoJohn Price Assocs. v. Warner Elec., Inc., 723 F.2d 755, 757 (10th
Cir. 1983) ("We need not address the propriety of the trial court's finding that a contract
existed between Price and Warner, since we agree that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
barred Warner from withdrawing its bid."); Henderson, supra note 1, at 345-46 ("[T]he

rules of Section 90 have independent force without regard to, and in spite of, the bargain
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promissory estoppel instead of bargain theory "even where there has
been a bargained-for reliance"3 3 or "even when no apparent barrier
34
exists to recovery on a traditional contract theory."
Scholars point to the well-known case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
Inc.3 5 to support the view of promissory estoppel as an independent
theory of obligation.3 6 In Hoffman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
awarded promissory estoppel relief upon finding that the plaintiff detrimentally relied upon the defendant's repeated assurances that it
would grant the plaintiff a grocery store franchise.3 7 In asserting the
independent basis of promissory estoppel, the court declared that "it
would be a mistake to regard an action grounded on promissory
estoppel as the equivalent of a breach of contract action."3 8 Despite
the lack of material terms essential to a binding contract, the court
held that Section 90 "does not impose the requirement that the promise

. . .

must be so comprehensive in scope as to meet the require-

ments of an offer that would ripen into a contract if accepted by the
promisee."3 9
Promissory estoppel's apparent proliferation and emergence as
an independent theory of obligation has led some scholars to sound
the death knell for the bargain theory of consideration. 40 Other theorists, however, insist that the widespread application of promissory estoppel merely reaffirms classical contract principles of promise and
41
consent.
Promise-focused theorists view the act of promising as involving
an implicit promise to honor the promise. 42 They argue that promise,
rather than detrimental reliance, has traditionally formed the core of
contractual liability because it reflects the promisor's consent to be
concept."); Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferationof Promissory Estappe, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 52, 52-54 (1981) (positing promissory estoppel as an independent theory of obligation based on the tort principle of reliance rather than on the
contract principle of consent).
33 ATIYAH, supra note 3, at 778.
34
Farber & Matheson, supra note 1, at 908.
35
133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
36 See Henderson, supra note 1, at 359; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 27, at 524-25.
37
133 N.W.2d at 274-75.
38 Id. at 275.
39 Id.
40
See, e.g., ATYAH, supra note 3, at 777 (recognizing the "resurgence of reliance-based
liability at the expense of consensual liability"); GILMoRE, supra note 3, at 72 (declaring
that the reliance principle has "swallowed up" the bargain principle of contract).
41 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 2, at 133 (asserting that "promissory estoppel... liability
can be understood as contractual in the broad sense that the promisor intended to be
legally bound under an objective standard"); Farber & Matheson, supranote 1, at 929 (proposing a promissory estoppel rule that "reinforces the traditional free-will basis of promissory liability"); Yorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 115 (proclaiming that "the governing
principle of Section 90 in the courts is promise").
42 See ATn'AH, supra note 3, at 654.
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bound. 43 Consent, in turn, is crucial to classical contract theory, for
which the source of contractual obligation is the will of the parties,
not mere formal requirements such as a written document. 44
For promise-focused theorists, the basis of promissory estoppel,
45
like that of traditional contract liability, is the promise, not reliance.
Thus, the expansion of promissory estoppel reinforces traditional contract principles of promise and consent rather than marking their demise. Theorists offer three supporting reasons for their promisebased view of promissory estoppel. First, they contend that courts
have applied promissory estoppel where no detrimental reliance occurred. 46 Second, they note that courts have refused to apply promissory estoppel where detrimental reliance occurred. 47 Finally, they
observe that when courts establish promissory estoppel liability, they
typically grant expectancy relief instead of limiting the remedy to reli48
ance damages.
Given their observations ofjudicial disregard of reliance in promissory estoppel cases, promise-focused theorists argue that both liability and remedy under promissory estoppel turn on "the proof and
quality of the promisor's commitment."4 9 Contrary to popular view,
promissory estoppel does not protect promisees' reliance on
promises. Instead, it aims to enforce seriously considered promises
and hold promisors to their voluntarily-made promises. 50 In doing so,
it reaffirms traditional contract principles of promise and consent at
the expense of the tort principle of reliance.
Death-of-contract scholars, on the other hand, contend that the
acceptance of the reliance principle has significantly undermined the
promissory basis of classical contract law. They observe that "few people today appear to have the same respect for the sanctity of bare
See id. at 652-59; Becker, supra note 2, at 133; Yorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 115.
But see H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any NaturalRights7, 64 PHIL. REv. 175 (1955) (viewing
promises as binding because the promisor receives benefits from making promises and
must, therefore, accept the obligations);John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 1
(1955) (same); Neil MacCormick, Voluntary Obligations and NormativePowers, in THE SYMPO43

SIA READ AT THEJoINT SESSION OF THE ARSToTELIAN SOCIETYAND THE MIND ASSOCIATION AT
THE UNrvERSrn OF HuLL 59 (1972) (viewing promises as binding because otherwise the

promisee may be worse off than had there been no promise at all). These scholars deviate
from traditional consensual-based contract theory in that their justifications for enforcing
promises ultimately rest on reliance or benefit principles.
44
Metzger & Phillips, supra note 27, at 494.
45
See sources cited supra note 41.
46
SeeYorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 112-13.
47 Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 167.
50

Id. at 161-66.
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promises, without regard to whether they have been paid for or relied
upon, that was commonly expressed a century ago."5 '
Both death-of-contract scholars and promise-focused theorists,
however, are wrong in two important respects. First, they misconceive
the nature of promissory estoppel by insisting on a dichotomous,
black-and-white view of the doctrine. On the one hand, death-of-contract scholars overestimate the reliance principle's role within promissory estoppel doctrine. On the other hand, promise-focused theorists
overvalue promissory estoppel's vindication of traditional contract
principles of promise and consent. Reducing promissory estoppel to
a single unifying principle may be too hasty. A more fruitful approach
would be to view promissory estoppel as a complex doctrine incorporating traditional contract principles of promise and consent as well as
52
"fairness" principles such as reliance.
More fundamentally, both death-of-contract scholars and promise-focused theorists (along with the drafters of the Restatement) erroneously assume that courts have wholeheartedly embraced promissory
estoppel doctrine. Promissory estoppel theory has become so entrenched in contract law that courts and commentators now take it for
granted. 53 Scholars, irrespective of their views on the nature of promissory estoppel, have extolled the doctrine as "a principle of wide application" 54 and as "perhaps the most radical and expansive
development of this century in the law of promissory liability."55 Recent cases, however, suggest that promissory estoppel may not be the
56
darling of contract law, as courts and scholars have widely assumed.
II
THE NARROW APPLICATION OF PRoMIssoRY ESTOPPEL:
STRICT REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOVERY

The general acceptance of promissory estoppel as a doctrine of
widespread applicability has been largely based on the misperception
of an abundance of common law precedents providing for promissory
51 ATIYAH, supra note 3, at 655.
52 For an account of modem contract theory that sees a balanced employment of
each of these principles, see Robert A. Hillman, The Crisisin Modem ContractTheory, 67 TEx.
L. Rnv. 103, 115 (1988).
53
See, e.g., ATYAH-, supra note 3, at 771 ("The past hundred years have witnessed a
resurgence of reliance-based liabilities ...."); Henderson, supra note 1, at 343 ("Recent
decisions... demonstrate that the doctrine of promissory estoppel... is playing an important role in the fixing of limits of contractual responsibility."); Yorio & Thel, supra note 1,
at 167 ("Section 90 has greatly expanded the scope of civil liability in twentieth-century

American law.").
54 Feinman, supra note 2, at 678.
55 Knapp, supra note 32, at 53.
56 See infra Part II, arguing that case law does not support the view that promissory
estoppel has gained wide judicial acceptance.
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estoppel relief. Even the few observers noting restrictions on the application of promissory estoppel have viewed such judicial reluctance
as the rare exception rather than the norm.57 Although many studies
have cited numerous cases giving effect to promissory estoppel doctrine,58 most of these cited cases were decided before 198159 and thus
do not accurately reflect more recent applications of promissory estoppel. Given the 1981 publication date of the second Restatement, it is
important to see how courts since 1981 have applied the revised Section 90. Additionally, many of the cases relied on by scholars are federal court cases, which are not authoritative sources of state law on
promissory estoppel. 60 Furthermore, a number of the cited cases hold
merely that the promisee has stated a sufficient cause of action or
61
presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment.
Although such cases give some indication of judicial acceptance of
promissory estoppel, they are not determinative in the absence of a
final grant of relief.
Despite the widespread perception of promissory estoppel's
proliferation, recent empirical evidence points to the contrary. A
broad survey of all reported state court cases decided between 1981
and 1992 reveals only twenty-eight successful promissory estoppel
cases in which courts granted relief.62 In fact, a more detailed survey
57
See, e.g., Lawrence Kalevitch, Contract Law, 14 NovA L. REv. 663 (1990); Lu Ann
Brown, Note, Contracts-IsPromissoiyEstoppel ForeverEstopped in North Carolina?, 10 CAMP-

BELL L. REv. 293 (1988).

58 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 2; Farber & Matheson, supra note 1; Feinman, supra
note 2; Yorio & Thel, supra note 1. At least one cited court decision, which established
promissory estoppel liability, has been reversed and remanded for a new trial. See Farm
Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old Nat'l Bank, 685 P.2d 1097 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 750 P.2d
231 (Wash. 1988), cited in Becker, supra note 2, at 131 n.1.
59 E.g., In re Estate of Bucci, 488 P.2d 216 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971), cited in Becker, supra
note 2, at 134 n.20.
60 E.g., Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981), cited in Feinman,
supra note 2, at 688 n.53.
61 See, e.g., Glover v. Sager, 667 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1983) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment), cited in Farber & Matheson, supra note 1, at
908 n.19.
62 This survey is based on a LEXIS search of all reported state trial and appellate
court cases granting promisory estoppel relief between 1981 and 1992. See Crook v.
Mortenson-Neal, 727 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1986); Ralston Purina Co. v. McCollum, 611 S.W.2d
201 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981); Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Ct.
App. 1988); McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Ct. App. 1984);
Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1983); Snow Basin, Ltd. v. Boettcher & Co., 805
P.2d 1151 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied (1991); Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. v.
Liberty County, 406 So. 2d 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds,421 So. 2d
505 (Fla. 1982); Cullen Distrib., Inc. v. Petty, 517 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); First Nat'l
Bank v. Logan Mfg. Co., 577 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1991); Telephone Assocs. v. St. Louis County
Bd., 364 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 1985); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114
(Minn. 1981); Dallum v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 462 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990); Whipple v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 621, 424 N.W.2d 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988);
Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245 (N.Y. 1983); Zimmerman v. Zimmer-
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of New York and California court cases decided during the same period indicates ajudicial tendency to reject the vast majority of promissory estoppel claims while validating such claims in only rare
63
circumstances.
Since 1981, the New York courts have addressed the issue of
promissory estoppel in only thirty-four reported cases, 64 while the California courts have done so in just thirteen reported cases. 65 This low
rate of occurrence suggests that promissory estoppel may not be as
significant a legal issue as many courts and scholars have assumed.
Of the thirty-four New York cases, the courts rejected twenty-nine
promissory estoppel claims, 6 6 upheld three claims as presenting a triaman, 447 N.Y.S.2d 675 (App. Div. 1982); Newkirk v. Precision Automotive, Inc., No. 12498,
1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 967 (Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1992); Wallace v. Gray Drug, Inc., No. 57031,
1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3670 (Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1990); Worrell v. Multipress Corp., Nos.
86AP-909 and 86AP-1010, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 188 (Ct. App.Jan. 21, 1988), af/'d inpart,
rev'd in part,543 N.E.2d 1277 (Ohio 1989); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 529 N.E.2d 958
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Smith v. Minnis, No. CA84-07-080, 1985 WL 121500 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 31, 1985); Oak Tree Ctr., Inc. v. Kroger Co., No. 43420, 1981 WL 4568 (Ohio Ct. App.
Oct. 22, 1981); Arasi v. Neema Medical Servs., Inc., 595 A.2d 1205 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
Minor v. Sully Buttes Sch. Dist. No. 58-2, 345 N.W.2d 48 (S.D. 1984); Adams v. Petrade
Int'l, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Stacy v. Merchants Bank, 482 A.2d 61 (Vt.
1984); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Siebol, 824 P.2d 1252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992);Jet Boats,
Inc. v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 721 P.2d 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Family Medical Bldg.,
Inc. v. State of Washington Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 684 P.2d 77 (Wash. Ct. App.
1984).
63 This survey is based on Professor Robert A. Hillman's recent collection of California and New York trial and appellate court cases decided between 1981 and 1992. Professor Hillman conducted a LEXIS search of all cases where the California and New York state
courts expressly addressed the issue of promissory estoppel in their opinions. The cases
were categorized according to the resolution of the estoppel issue. There were three possible outcomes: rejection of promissory estoppel as inapplicable to the case; recognition of
its applicability to the case, pending further resolution of the facts; and application of
estoppel theory to establish liability and allow recovery. See ROBERT A. HILZMAN, THEORIES
OF CoNTRAcr: THE RICHNESS AND VITALITY OF MODERN CoNTRAcT LAw (Draft).
64 See cases cited infra notes 66-68.
65 See cases cited infra notes 69-71.

66 See Cohen v. Brown, Harris, Stevens, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1984); Bon Temps
Agency, Ltd. v. Towers Org., Inc., 590 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 1992), cert. denied, 619 N.E.2d
658 (N.Y. 1993); Wurmfeld Assocs., P.C. v. Harlem Interfaith Counseling Servs., Inc., 578
N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 1992); Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Pinros & Gar Corp., 571 N.Y.S.2d 237
(App. Div. 1991); Messina v. Biderman, 571 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 1991); Clinton v. Int'l
Business Machs. Corp., 570 N.Y.S.2d 405 (App. Div. 1991); Advanced Refractory Technologies, Inc. v. Power Auth. of New York, 568 N.Y.S.2d 986 (App. Div. 1991); Gold v. Vitucci,
563 N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. Div. 1990); Nicit v. Nicit, 555 N.Y.S.2d 474 (App. Div. 1990);
Lerman v. Medical Assocs., 554 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div. 1990); Modell & Co. v. City of N.Y.,
552 N.Y.S.2d 632 (App. Div. 1990); Cane v. Farmelo, 543 N.Y.S.2d 775 (App. Div. 1989);
Aeromar C. Por A. v. Port Auth., 536 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. Div. 1988); Carvel Corp. v. Nicolini, 535 N.Y.S.2d 379 (App. Div. 1988); Bernard v. Langan Porsche Audi, Inc., 532
N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Div. 1988); Dalton v. Union Bank of Switz., 520 N.Y.S.2d 764 (App. Div.
1987); Country-Wide Leasing Corp. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div.
1987); Tutak v. Tutak, 507 N.Y.S.2d 232 (App. Div. 1986); Chemical Bank v. City ofJamestown, 504 N.Y.S.2d 908 (App. Div. 1986); Klein v. Jamor Purveyors, Inc., 489 N.Y.S.2d 556
(App. Div. 1985); Cunnison v. Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App.
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ble issue (i.e., stating a sufficient cause of action or presenting sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment), 6 7 and established
liability (or at least allowed the issue to go to the jury) in only two
cases. 68 Of the thirteen California cases, the courts rejected promissory estoppel claims in ten of those cases, 69 upheld one claim as
presenting a triable issue, 70 and established liability (or at least allowed the issue to go to the jury) in only two cases. 7 ' The infrequency
with which state courts, particularly New York and California, actually
grant promissory estoppel relief belies the judicial lip service given to
the viability of promissory estoppel as a theory of recovery.
A.

Cases Providing Relief Under Promissory Estoppel

The few state court cases that have provided promissory estoppel
relief can be categorized as follows: those where an alternative breach
of contract ground actually or theoretically exists; those involving a
failure of substantive contract requirements of consideration, offer,
and acceptance; and those involving a failure of formal contract requirements of writing imposed by the Statute of Frauds.
1. Existence of Alternative Ground of Breach of Contract
Courts are likely to allow recovery under promissory estoppel
where they also actually found or could have found a breach of conDiv. 1985); Ski-View, Inc. v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Ct. Cl. 1985); D & N Boening, Inc. v.
Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div.), affd, 472 N.E.2d 992 (N.Y. 1984);
Long Island Pen Corp. v. Shatsky Metal Stamping Co., 463 N.Y.S.2d 39 (App. Div. 1983);
Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 462 N.Y.S.2d 917 (App. Div. 1983), afj'd, 465 N.E.2d 361 (N.Y.
1984);.Ripple's of Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre Assocs., 452 N.Y.S.2d 447 (App. Div. 1982);
Tribune Printing Co. v. 263 Ninth Ave. Realty, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div.), aft'd, 444
N.E.2d 35 (1982); Ginsberg v. Fairfield-Noble Corp., 440 N.Y.S.2d 222 (App. Div. 1981);
Edward Joy Co. v. Noise Control Prods., Inc., 443 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
67 See Urban Holding Corp. v. Haberman, 556 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990);
Allen v. Board of Educ., 563 N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Buddman Distribs., Inc. v.
Labatt Importers, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 395 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
68 See Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245 (N.Y. 1983); Zimmerman v.
Zimmerman, 447 N.Y.S.2d 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
69 See San Marcos Water Dist. v. San Marcos Unified Sch. Dist., 720 P.2d 935 (Cal.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1079 (1987); Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. California Dep't of
Parks & Recreation, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1992); Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood
Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Ct App. 1992); Peterson Dev. Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank, 284 Cal.
Rptr. 367 (Ct. App. 1991); Smith v. City of S.F., 275 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1990);
Kurokawa v. Blum, 245 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1988); Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct. App. 1986); Hoover Community Hotel Dev. Corp. v.
Thomson, 213 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Ct. App. 1985); Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr.
345 (Ct. App. 1984); Downer v. Bramet, 199 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1984).
70
See Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784 (Ct. App. 1990).
71 See Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Ct.App. 1988);
McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Ct. App. 1984), vacated on
othergrounds, 751 P.2d 1329 (Cal. 1988).
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tract. For example, in Mers v. Dispatch PrintingCo.,7 2 the plaintiff-employee, a traveling salesperson, was suspended without pay as a result
of his arrest on serious criminal charges. The defendant-employer
promised to reinstate him with back pay if the charges were favorably
resolved. Consequently, the employee continued to work during his
suspension period and did not look for another job. Although the
condition of reinstatement was met when the charges were eventually
dropped following a hung jury trial, the employer denied reinstatement and dismissed the employee. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled
in favor of the employee on both promissory estoppel and breach of
contract grounds.
The Mers court first concluded that the parties' employment contract did not result in an at-will employment, but rather included an
implied-in-fact agreement that the employee could not be discharged
without just cause. In light of the employer's promise of reinstatement and the employee's giving of consideration by continuing to
work, the court found a lack ofjust cause dismissal and thus a breach
of contract.
The court's discussion of the alternative ground of promissory estoppel proceeded in much the same way. The only difference was the
use of reliance language: the employer's promise of reinstatement
modified an otherwise at-will employment contract and was made enforceable by the employee's reliance in continuing to work and not
looking for another job.
Even where courts fail to address, or outright reject, the alternative ground of breach of contract, they nonetheless employ in their
promissory estoppel analysis the traditional contract method of implying a contract term as a matter of law. For example, Grouse v. Group
Health Plan, Inc.73 involved a prospective employee's claim for detrimental reliance on ajob offer of a pharmacist position. Group Health
Plan refused to honor its commitment to hire Grouse because it did
not receive any favorable character references on him. By that time,
however, Grouse had already accepted the offer, declined another offer, and quit his former job. The Minnesota Supreme Court asserted
that no contract existed because the agreement was terminable at will.
Nonetheless, it held the employer liable by implying a good faith duty
to allow the employee the opportunity to commence work. Although
the court found this duty enforceable by the employee's detrimental
reliance, it could just as easily have done so on the traditional contract
ground that the employee accepted the offer and gave consideration
by promising to work. Thus, despite the court's professed refusal to
72

529 N.E.2d 958 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).

73

306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. Ct. App. 1981).
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apply breach of contract theory, its method of analysis lent itself to a
breach of contract interpretation.
2.

Failureof Substantive Contract Requirements

In construction bidding cases invoking promissory estoppel, a
plaintiff typically seeks to enforce a bid despite the absence of a final
acceptance. The Alaska Supreme Court took this approach in Crook v.
Mortenson-Nea474 which involved a general contractor's suit against a
subcontractor who revoked its bid to provide glass, windows, and
doors. After Mortonson-Neal Joint Venture (M-N), the general contractor, requested that NGC Investment and Development, Inc.
(NGC), the subcontractor, begin work immediately on the shop drawings, NGC informed M-N that it first needed either a notice to proceed or a contract. M-N accordingly sent a notice to proceed, stating
M-N's intent to employ NGC as subcontractor. NGC then agreed to
begin work while the parties negotiated a final written contract. The
parties subsequently drew up a final written contract, which was
signed by NGC, but not by M-N. After M-N expressed strong concerns
over NGC's delays in producing acceptable shop drawings and warned
NGC of the consequences of further delay, NGC unilaterally repudiated the contract by letter.
Despite the lack of final acceptance by M-N, the Alaska Supreme
Court applied promissory estoppel doctrine and held that "the parties
had a contract with terms covering the details of their agreement left
open."7 5 The application of promissory estoppel effectively converted
NGC's bid into an option contract, whereby the subcontractor's bid
was binding for a reasonable period of time.7 6 In reformulating Section 90's requirements, the court held that "a substantial change of
position" must have occurred.7 7 Mere reliance will not suffice-reliance must be substantial The court seemed persuaded that M-N's reliance was substantial when it concluded that "M-N relied not only on
the original bid, but on four months of repeated assurances of performance and lack of objections by NGC."7 8 Had M-N merely relied
on NGC's bid by including the bid in its general contract bid, its reliance would not have been substantial because the only resulting injury
would have been the loss of expectations; it would have had to pay the
higher price of the next lowest bidder regardless of its reliance. However, since NGC waited four months to repudiate, the causal connection between M-N's reliance and injury is much more definite and
74
75
76

77
78

727 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1986).
Id. at 303.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
Id. at 304.
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substantial. But for M-N's reliance on NGC's continued assurances,
M-N would have promptly solicited the next lowest bidder and thus,
would not have incurred the costs associated with NGC's work
79
delays.
The court further found that the additional terms included in the
unexecuted written contract were not "material alterations" to NGC's
bid proposal. Rather, they "covered issues which can be implied from
industry custom or left open for further negotiations" and therefore
did not impose "duties on NGC materially different from those NGC
should have known would apply." 80 Thus, the Crook court held NGC's
bid enforceable only upon finding substantial reliance and an intent
to reduce the parties' agreement to writing.
3.

Failureof Formal ContractRequirements of Writing under the
Statute of Frauds

Courts typically look for unconscionable circumstances before
they will apply promissory estoppel to defeat Statute of Frauds requirements. 8 1 This heightened scrutiny apparently accounts for the small
number of promissory estoppel claims that succeed despite the Statute of Frauds defense.8 2 These cases suggest that there are few situations which courts would deem unconscionable enough to trigger
promissory estoppel liability.
On the rare occasion that a promisee's act of reliance would unjustly enrich the promisor, courts may opt to grant relief under promissory estoppel.8 3 Judicial concern with preventing unjust enrichment
may explain why courts typically provide relief only in commercial bar79

Indeed, the court recognized such a causal connection: "A subcontractor cannot

string along the general until the time for performance nears and then suddenly limit its
promised performance. Such conduct forces the general to accept a substitute performance or face delays in finding a substitute subcontractor." Id. at 303.
80

Id.

81 See infra Part III.B.4.
82 This survey has uncovered only six successful claims involving the Statute of Frauds
defense. See Ralston Purina Co.v. McCollum, 611 S.W.2d 201 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981); Allied
Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Ct. App. 1988); Farash v. Sykes
Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245 (N.Y. 1983); Worrell v. Multipress, Inc., 534 N.E.2d 84
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Smith v. Minnis, No. CA84-07-080, 1985 WL 17382 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 31, 1985); Adams v. Petrade Int'l, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. CL App. 1988).
83 In Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., the court stated that unconscionable injury may "occur[ ] in cases of unjust enrichment." 249 Cal. Rptr. at 878. Furthermore, in
Farashv. Sykes Datatronics,Inc., the court held that "apromisee who partially performs.., at
a promisor's request should be allowed to recover [damages]." 452 N.E.2d at 1248. There,
the lessee-promisor breached an oral lease. The lessor-promisee made building improvements in reliance on the lease, but the promisee never occupied the building. Although
the promisee did not directly benefit from the lessor's performance, the court suggested
that the promisee indirectly benefited " '[i] f what the [promisor] has done is part of the
agreed exchange.' " Id. (quotingJoHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PMlLLO, CON~rRACTS § 15-

4, 574 (2d ed. 1977)).
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gain situations. In private donative settings, generous benefactors typically do not expect to profit at the expense of their promisees8 4 In
the commercial context, however, courts can be reasonably assured
that the promisor intended to benefit from the promisee's reliance,
where the parties have made a bargained-for exchange, but merely
failed to reduce their agreement to writing. Hence, in the absence of
a written contract required by the Statute of Frauds, the court in Allied
Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co.8 5 required a finding of "all the elements of a contract" before the promisee could recover promissory
estoppel damages. The court's insistence on finding the presence of a
bargained-for exchange before it could enforce the terms of the
agreement indicates the court's concern with ensuring that neither
party is unjustly enriched.
The unjust enrichment concern may also explain why courts consider definite and substantial reliance as a factor in determining unconscionable circumstances.8 6 In bargain arrangements, the
promisee often relies by performing at the promisor's request and for
the promisor's benefit. Hence, the greater the reliance, the more the
promisor is enriched, and the more unjust the enrichment becomes.
In addition to considering unjust enrichment as an unconscionable circumstance, courts may also focus on whether the promisor
agreed to memorialize the terms of the oral contract.8 7 The policy
behind the Statute of Frauds' requirement may not be as compelling
where the promisor agreed to commit the oral contract to writing or
misrepresented the existence of a written agreement. Accordingly,
courts are more willing to apply promissory estoppel in these cases.8 8
B.

Cases Rejecting Promissory Estoppel Liability
1. No "Clear and Definite" Promise

Courts often invalidate promissory estoppel claims for lack of a
clear and definite promise.8 9 Although courts may further find no
84

In all six successful claims involving the Statute of Frauds defense, the courts found

that the parties had made oral contracts. None of the cases involved gratuitous promises.
See cases cited supra note 82.
85 249 Cal. Rptr. 872, 879 (Ct. App. 1988).
86
See Ralston Purina Co. v. McCollum, 611 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981);
Worrell v. Multipress, Inc., 534 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Smith v. Minnis, No.
CA84-07-080, 1985 WL 17382 (Ohio Ct.App. July 31, 1985).
87
In Adams v. PetradeInt'%Inc., the court asserted that the application of promissory
estoppel against the Statute of Frauds is "limited to those cases in which the [promisee]
relied on an oral promise to furnish a written contract." 754 S.W.2d 696, 707 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988).
88 See Ralston, 611 S.W.2d at 201; Smith, No. CA84-07-080; Adams, 754 S.W.2d at 696.
89 See Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 129-31 (Ct. App.
1992); Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. California Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d
335 (Ct. App. 1992); Peterson Dev. Co. v. Torrey Pines Bank, 284 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Ct. App.
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reasonable or reasonably foreseeable reliance, they typically only do
so where the promisor has not made a clear promise. 90 Frequently,
promises that courts dismiss are deemed either nonexistent or irrelevant. In these cases, the courts need not even consider the additional
question of whether the promise was sufficiently clear and definite.
Instead, the courts determine that the promisor made no promise at
all, 9 ' that other prior representations by the promisor contradicted or
negated the alleged promise, 92 or that the actual promise conditioned
93
performance on the occurrence of events that never came to pass.
In several cases, however, courts have held that even though the
promisor made the alleged promise, the promise was not sufficiently
clear or definite to be enforced. 9 4 One rhetorical strategy in such
1991); Wurmfeld Assocs., P.C. v. Harlem Interfaith Counseling Servs., Inc., 578 N.Y.S.2d
200 (App. Div. 1992); Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Pinros & Gar Corp., 571 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div.
1991); Messina v. Biderman, 571 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 1991); Nicit v. Nicit, 555 N.Y.S.2d
474 (App. Div. 1990); Lerman v. Medical Assocs. ofWoodhull, P.C., 554 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App.
Div. 1990); Chemical Bank v. City ofJamestown, 504 N.Y.S.2d 908 (App. Div. 1986); SkiView, Inc. v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Ct. Cl. 1985); Tribune Printing Co. v. 263 Ninth Ave.
Realty, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div. 1982); Ripple's of Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre
Assocs., 452 N.Y.S.2d 447 (App. Div. 1982).
90 See Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Pinros & Car Corp., 571 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div. 1991); Nicit
v. Nicit, 555 N.Y.S.2d 474 (App. Div. 1990).
91 See Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 129-31 (defendantuniversity never represented that hospital blood supply was safe, where plaintiff contracted
AIDS virus from blood transfusion); Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. California Dep't of Parks &
Recreation, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338 (government agency never promised to negotiate for
contract modification); Wurmfeld Assocs., P. C. v. Harlem Interfaith Counseling Servs.,
Inc., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 201 (state defendants were not parties to the contract with plaintiff,
nor did they promise to assume any contractual liability); Lerman v. Medical Assocs. of
Woodhull, P.C., 554 N.Y.S.2d at 272 (employment contract specified neither duration nor
dismissal for cause); Dalton v. Union Bank of Switz., 520 N.Y.S.2d 764, 765-66 (App. Div.
1987) (employer offered only at-will, not one-year or for-cause, employment); Ripple's of
Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre Assocs., 452 N.Y.S.2d at 449 (defendant-lessors did not orally
promise to give eighteen-months' notice before terminating business lease).
Although the court in Wurmfeld also found no reliance because plaintiffs began rendering services before their relationship with defendants, this conclusion is a weak basis for
its holding. Plaintiffs' continued performance after their relationship with defendants may
still have constituted reliance. 578 N.Y.S.2d at 201. In Racin4 the plaintiff did not sue
under promissory estoppel. The court, however, made it a point to reject its application
anyway. 14 Cal. Rptr.2d at 340.
92 See Wurmfeld 578 N.Y.S.2d at 201 (state defendants expressly disavowed contractual
liability); Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Pinros & Car Corp., 571 N.Y.S.2d at 238 (promisor's written
representations contradicted terms of alleged oral distributorship agreement); Ski-View,
Inc. v. State, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 869 (state defendant's representations expressly negated
promise to issue permit).
93 See Nicit v. Nicit, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76 (defendant-wife's offer to sell share of property contemplated matrimonial relief, which did not occur); Chemical Bank v. City of
Jamestown, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (defendant's promise to loan money depended upon applicant's meeting loan requirements).
94 See Messina v. Biderman, 571 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 1991); Tribune Printing Co.
v. 263 Ninth Ave. Realty, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div. 1982).
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cases is to characterize the promise as a promise to negotiate rather
than as a promise to perform.
For example, in Messina v. Biderman,95 the promisees had exclusive rights to negotiate with the city to purchase business property.
They alleged that the city subsequently made a written memorial entidiing them to submit their property development plan to the city's
board of estimate. The city, however, failed to close the deal. Despite
the promisee's pre-existing right to negotiate with the city, the court
held that the written memorial constituted only an agreement to negotiate because it lacked additional material terms.
Similarly, in Tribune PrintingCo. v. 263 Ninth Avenue Realty, Inc.,96
the court concluded that a landlord's alleged oral promise to renew a
business lease was not a promise to perform but a promise to negotiate for more definite terms. The court then rejected promissory estoppel as inapplicable to the case. 97 Thus, in the absence of
additional material terms, courts may refuse to enforce a commitment
to sell or lease property by labeling it a mere promise to negotiate.
Although Section 90 requires merely a promise, courts tend to
reject promissory estoppel claims for ambiguity or indefiniteness. 98
Courts may require that promises include such additional material
terms as courts deem appropriate. Moreover, courts reluctant to invoke promissory estoppel may intentionally explain away a promise to
perform by labeling it as a mere agreement to negotiate. 99 The distinction between a promise to perform and an agreement to negotiate, particularly in the commercial context, is often so unclear that it
would not be difficult to classify a given promise as one or the
other. 0 0 Given that promissory estoppel has its roots in equity, courts
could legitimately supply the missing material terms they deem necessary to make a promise sufficiently clear and definite. Yet, judicial
refusal to do so indicates a narrowing of promissory estoppel doctrine.

95

571 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 1991).

96

452 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div. 1982).

Id. at 593. Although the court did not specify the grounds for rejecting promissory
estoppel, its opinion suggests two possible grounds. In addition to the lack of a definite
promise, plaintiff's reliance was not "unequivocally referable" to the alleged promise to
defeat Statute of Frauds requirements. Id.
98 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
100 See Farber & Matheson, supranote 1, at 915 ("[C]ourts have long had trouble distinguishing binding commitments from other communications such as opinions, predictions,
or negodtiation.") (emphasis added).
97
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No 'Definite and Substantial"Reliance

Rather than finding no clear promise, courts may instead determine that no detrimental reliance occurred.1 01 Detrimental reliance
comprises two elements: reliance and injury. A promissory estoppel
claim may fail because the promisee did not rely on the promise at all.
Alternatively, it may fail because no injury resulted from reliance.
Although some of the claims that courts have rejected for lack of detrimental reliance are weak cases for meeting Section 90's reliance requirement, 0 2 others are not so easy to dismiss.
In Smith v. City of San Francisco,'0 3 the city of San Francisco promised to give fair consideration to the promisees' land development applications. In fact, it encouraged the promisees by suggesting various
uses for the land. Despite the court's assertion that the promisees
stated no facts demonstrating reliance, the facts clearly indicate that
the promisees relied on the city's promise by undertaking the expense
04
of preparing and submitting their development plans.'
In Ripple's of Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre Associates,'0 5 the plaintifflessee alleged it had maintained and improved the premises in reliance on defendant-lessor's promise to give eighteen months' notice
before terminating the business lease. Although the court found no
clear promise, it also rejected the promissory estoppel claim for lack
of reliance.' 0 6 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs ongoing catering business required it to continue to maintain and improve the
premises, with or without a promise of eighteen months notice of
lease termination. Thus, the plaintiffs expenditures were not "unequivocally referable" to the alleged oral promise.' 07 The court could
have found, however, that the plaintiff continued to maintain and improve the premises in the belief that it would have at least eighteen
months to enjoy the property improvements.
101 See Smith v. City of S.F., 275 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1990); Kurokawa v. Blum, 245
Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1988); Hoover Community Hotel Dev. Corp. v. Thomson, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 750 (Ct. App. 1985); Downer v. Bramet, 199 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1984); Clinton v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 570 N.Y.S.2d 405 (App. Div. 1991); Silver v. Mohasco
Corp., 462 N.Y.S.2d 917 (App. Div. 1983); Ripple's of Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre Assocs.,
452 N.Y.S.2d 447 (App. Div. 1982).
102
See Kurokawa, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (where former domestic partner never requested forbearance of legal rights, plaintiff neither alleged nor showed such forbearance
or any other act of reliance on partner's alleged promise of financial support); Hoover
Community Hote4 213 Cal. Rptr. at 758 (where plaintiff failed to accept defendant-church's
offer to sell property, no detrimental reliance occurred); Downer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34
(where employer's intended transfer of property interest was a gift, not a promised retire-

ment benefit, employee could not have detrimentally relied by remaining with employer).
103

275 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1990).

104

Id. at 19-20, 23.

105

452 N.Y.S.2d 447 (App. Div. 1982).
Id. at 449.
Id.

106
107
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Section 90 does not expressly require that injury result from the
promisee's reliance. Nonetheless, courts and scholars often regard resultant injury as an essential element "because without injury there
would be no injustice in not enforcing the promise."'u0 For example,
Clinton v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.1°9 rejected a promissory
estoppel claim because the promisees' injury did not result from reliance on the promise. In that case, the promisor requested that the
promisees not oppose a proposed law that would prohibit the promisees from parking at their business site. In return, the promisor agreed
to help the promisees find another parking site for their business.
The town passed the law, repealed it, and then ordered the promisees
not to park at their business site anymore. Despite the promisees' performance in accordance with the promisor's request, the court refused to enforce the promise because the town, and not the promisor,
was responsible for the promisees' displacement." 0
Despite evidence that a promisee's reliance resulted in injury,
courts may still hold that the injury is not definite or significant
enough to warrant recovery. In Silver v. Mohasco Corp.,"' the defendant allegedly promised not to inform the plaintiff's prospective
employers that it had terminated plaintiffs employment. Notwithstanding the possible injury resulting from the plaintiffs reliance on
the promise, the court held that the plaintiff failed to allege any "sub112
stantial and concrete" injury.
Courts' rejection of claims for lack of detrimental reliance, despite evidence of some reliance, suggests a higher standard of scrutiny. 113 Contrary to the spirit and letter of Section 90, mere
detrimental reliance does not seem sufficient to trigger liability. Reliance must be "definite and substantial" before a court will allow
recovery.
The cases rejecting promissory estoppel claims on reliance
grounds suggest that the promisee must establish definite and substantial reliance by showing that the promise dispositively induced her
to specifically act (or forbear). The promisee may not simply allege
general reliance on the promise. 1 4 Moreover, it is not sufficient that
108 JOHN D. G AMAJU &JosEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRACrs § 6-1, at 273 (3d
ed. 1987).
109 570 N.Y.S.2d 405 (App. Div. 1991).
110 Id. at 406-07.
111 462 N.Y.S.2d 917 (App. Div. 1983), affd., 476 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1984).
112
Id. at 920.
113 Cf Yorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 157-59 (arguing that courts apply promissory
estoppel even where promisees only acted in contemplation of promise or in a manner
consistent with reliance on promise).
114 See Smith v. City of S.F., 275 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[0] ther than their
conclusory allegation that they reasonably and justifiably relied on the City's promises,
appellants allege no facts demonstrating such reliance.").
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she specifically acted in contemplation of the promise or in a manner
consistent with reliance on the promise."15 For that matter, it is not
sufficient that the promise was one among several factors leading to
her detrimental act. Rather, she must show a "but for" causality. It
must be clear that but for the promise, she would not have so acted.
Thus, as we saw in Smith v. City of San Francisco,116 despite the
promisees' reliance in preparing and submitting land development
plans to the city, the court seemed to believe that they would have
acted the same way even without the city's promise. The promisees
would have still needed to apply with the city to develop their land.
17
The estoppel claim therefore failed to show definite reliance.
The requirement of definite reliance causes difficulty for promisees who acted specifically in reliance on the promise but who cannot
easily prove that they would have acted differently had it not been for
the promise. To vindicate their promissory estoppel claims, these
promisees must subject themselves to post-hoc judicial conjectures as
to what they would or would not have done in the absence of the
promise.
3.

Governmental Agencies Acting Within Statutory Authority

Absent unusual circumstances, promissory estoppel cannot be
used against government agencies or municipalities that act within
their statutory authority, even if such action is in breach of a prior
promise. 1 8 Courts may justify this rule, expressly or implicitly, on
three different grounds. First, courts may find it unreasonable to rely
on a promise that is not clear and definite. For example, in Modell &
Co. v. City of New York, 1 19 the plaintiff alleged reliance on a city official's written representation to renew a business lease. The court,
however, held that since the written representation did not fully comply with statutory requirements, it could not constitute a clear and
definite promise by the government. The plaintiff's reliance there120
fore could not have been reasonable.
Second, courts may also determine that justice does not require
enforcement of a governmental promise where enforcement would
compromise "a strong rule of policy, adopted for the [public] bene115
Cf Yorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 154 ("[O]nly rarely do courts seem to require
proof that the promisee would have acted differently had the promise not been made.").
116
275 Cal. Rptr. at 23.

117

Id.
See San Marcos Water Dist. v. San Marcos Unified Sch. Dist., 720 P.2d 935, 943 (Cal.
1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1087 (1987); Advanced Refractory Technologies, Inc. v. Power
Auth., 568 N.Y.S.2d 986 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 578 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1991); Modell &
Co. v. City of N.Y., 552 N.Y.S.2d 632 (App. Div. 1990).
119 552 N.Y.S.2d 632 (App. Div. 1990).
120 Id.
118
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fit."' 2 1 For example, in San Marcos Water District v. San Marcos Unified
School District,122 the school district promised to pay special assessment
fees to the water district. The court held that the school district was
exempt from such fees. Requiring payment by the school district
would only undermine the legislative goal of maintaining balanced
public funding and of minimizing administrative costs.' 23 San Marcos
thus illustrates that it may be against public policy to enforce a governmental promise that would impede the government's proper
functions.
A third ground for denying promissory estoppel relief against the
government is that detrimental reliance is often difficult to prove in
such cases. In Advanced Refractory Technology v. Power Authority,124 the
court refused to invoke promissory estoppel to prevent the state
power authority from raising its utility rates. Absent the alleged promise, a regulated individual is still subject to governmental authority. It
would be difficult to show that the promisee incurred lost opportunity
costs or that she would have been in a better position had the government not made the promise.
4.

No "Unconscionable Circumstances" to Defeat Statute of Frauds
Requirements

Although the Statute of Frauds generally requires written and
signed documentation for certain contracts, Section 139 allows enforcement of such promises even if they fail Statute of Frauds requirements.' 25 Courts, however, have not been so heedless of those
requirements. 126 They frequently reject promissory estoppel claims
upon finding that no "unconscionable circumstances" exist to warrant
defeating Statute of Frauds requirements.1 27 The circumstances to
San Marcos Water Dist., 720 P.2d at 943 (citing City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476
P.2d 423 (Cal. 1970)).
122
Id. at 935.
123 Id. at 943.
124 568 N.Y.S.2d 986 (App. Div. 1991).
125
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 139.
126 See, e.g., Gold v. Vitucci, 563 N.Y.S.2d 443 (App. Div. 1990); Cane v. Farmelo, 543
N.Y.S.2d 775 (App. Div. 1989).
127
See Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct. App.
1986); Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1984); Bon Temps
Agency, Ltd. v. Towers Org., Inc., 590 N.Y.S.2d 97 (App. Div. 1992); Aeromar C. Por A. v.
Port Auth., 536 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. Div. 1988); Carvel Corp. v. Nicolini, 535 N.Y.S.2d 379
(App. Div. 1988); Bernard v. Langan Porsche Audi, Inc., 532 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Div.
1988); Country-Wide Leasing Corp. v. Subaru of America, 520 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div.
1987); Tutak v. Tutak, 507 N.Y.S.2d 232 (App. Div. 1986); Cunnison v. Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div. 1985); Klein v. Jamor Purveyors, Inc., 489
N.Y.S.2d 556 (App. Div. 1985); D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 471 N.Y.S.2d
299 (App. Div.), affd, 472 N.E.2d 992 (N.Y. 1984); Long Island Pen Corp. v. Shatsky Metal
Stamping Co., 463 N.Y.S.2d 39 (App. Div. 1983); Ginsberg v. Fairfield-Noble Corp., 440
N.Y.S.2d 222 (App. Div. 1981).
121
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consider may include the nature and extent of the injury, the character of reliance, the definiteness of the promise, and the reprehensiveness of the promisor's conduct.
Courts often decline to apply promissory estoppel as an alternative remedy for plaintiffs whose oral employment contracts fail the
Statute of Frauds. 128 Employees who rely upon promises of employment may suffer harm by changing or failing to change jobs or residence. Courts, however, do not regard such injury as unconscionable.
In Munoz v. KaiserSteel Corp., 12 9 the plaintiff permanently relocated in
reliance on the defendant's assurances of at least three years of employment. The court, however, held that the employee suffered no
unconscionable injury since he incurred negligible relocation costs
and had no other job or job offers prior to his employment. 30
In contrast, the employee in Cunnison v. Richardson Greenshields
Securities, Inc.'3 1 alleged that she did in fact forego otherjob opportunities in reliance on a five-year oral employment contract. The court
held that such circumstances were not "sufficiently egregious" to estop
the employer from raising a Statute of Frauds defense. Further, the
court declared that "a change of job or residence, by itself, is insufficient to trigger invocation of the promissory estoppel doctrine."' 13 2
Similarly, in Ginsberg v. Fairfield-Noble Corp.,133 the employee left his
former job to work for the defendant, who terminated employment
after only two months. In rejecting the promissory estoppel claim, the
court asserted, "The choice to forego current employment because of
rosy promises 'does not put the stigma of unconscionability upon the
defendants' right to assert the Statute of Frauds.' "1134
Courts' reluctance to invoke promissory estoppel theory to defeat
Statute of Frauds requirements extends not only to oral employment
contracts, but also to oral property leases.' 3 5 In Tribune PrintingCo. v.
263 Ninth Avenue Realty, Inc.,'3 6 the plaintiff-lessee alleged that it
helped the defendant-lessor purchase the leased property by providing a written statement that supported the lessor's application for fi128
See Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1984); Cunnison v.
Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div. 1985); Ginsberg v. Fairfield-Noble Corp., 440 N.Y.S.2d 222 (App. Div. 1981).
129 203 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1984).
130 Id. at 349.
13'
485 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div. 1985).
132
Id. at 275. In addition to finding no "egregious" injury, the court also asserted that
the employee's reliance was not "unequivocally referable" to the alleged promise of employment for five years. Id. at 276-77.
'33
440 N.Y.S.2d 222 (App. Div. 1981).
134 Id. at 225 (quoting Swerdloff v. Mobil Oil Corp., 427 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div.
1980)).
135 See Cohen v. Brown, 475 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1984); Tribune Printing Co. v. 263 Ninth
Ave. Realty, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div. 1982).
136
452 N.Y.S.2d 590 (App. Div. 1982).
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nancing. In return, the lessor promised to renew the lessee's business
lease. The court concluded that there were no "unusual circumstances" to justify invoking promissory estoppel. It asserted that the
lessee's reliance in the form of the written statement was not "unequivocally referable" to the alleged oral promise.' 3 7 The court also
noted that oral property lease agreements are not definite enough to
13 8
merit reasonable reliance.
Rather than focusing on the extent of the injury, the nature of
the reliance, or the definiteness of the promise, courts may instead
decide that the promisor's conduct was not so unconscionable as to
warrant promissory estoppel liability in contravention of Statute of
Frauds requirements. Hence, in EdwardJoy Co. v. Noise Control Products, Inc.,'3 9 where a contractor detrimentally relied upon an erroneous price quote by a subcontractor, the court rejected the promissory
estoppel claim because the subcontractor's mathematical mistake was
neither fraudulent nor unconscionable.
III
IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN CONTRACT THEORY

A.

The Joint Roles of Consent and Reliance in Promissory
Estoppel

The strict standards of scrutiny that courts impose on promissory
estoppel claims reveal that both consent and reliance are crucial to
promissory estoppel theory. The requirements of a clear promise and
substantial reliance lend support for the arguments of both promisefocused theorists and death-of-contract scholars regarding the respective roles of consent and reliance principles. Neither requirement,
however, dispositively validates absolutist claims that one principle
dominates promissory estoppel theory at the expense of the other.
1.

The Role of Consent

The surveyed cases demonstrate the crucial role that consent
plays in promissory estoppel adjudication. The requirement of a clear
and definite promise suggests that there is some truth in the claim of
promise-focused theorists that consensual, promise-based liability
dominates modem contract law, including promissory estoppel theory. The tort principle of reliance does not seem to account for the
requirement of a promise, let alone a clear promise. As Professors
Yorio and Thel argue, "[i] f the basis of recovery were harm caused by
the defendant's conduct, it should not matter whether the conduct
137

138

Id. at 593; see also supra note 132 and accompanying text.
452 N.Y.S.2d at 593.

139

443 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
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constituted a promise.' 40 Courts' insistence on a clear and definite
promise indicates a judicial impulse to enforce only seriously considered commitments. 141 In the absence of consideration and given the
frequent difficulty of distinguishing a binding promise to perform
from a mere agreement to negotiate, 142 the requirement of a clear
and definite promise assures greater accuracy in determining the
promisor's intent.
The need to determine precisely the promisor's intent and give
binding effect to that intent suggests that courts continue to value the
inherent moral force of a voluntarily given promise. The clear and
definite promise requirement supports the promise-focused theorists'
proposition that "[e]nforcement of a promise appears to be desired
for its own sake."' 43 Thus, the "impulse to hold [people] to their
promises,"' 44 as opposed to the sole desire to protect promisees from
harm, remains a major influence on judges.
The clear and definite promise requirement does not, however,
signal the victory of the contract-based consent principle over the tortbased reliance principle. The clear and definite promise requirement
may merely serve the function of screening out unreasonable reliance.
A reliance view of promissory estoppel does not require the doctrine
to protect all forms of reliance., In fact, promise-focused theorists concede that protecting only reasonable reliance is consistent with general reliance theory. 14 5 Furthermore, death-of-contract scholars argue
that by giving a promise, the promisor has invited others to trust, or
rely on, his word. 14 6 Such an express invitation of trust makes reliance
on the promise all the more reasonable.
2.

The Role of Reliance

As the foregoing discussion suggests, reliance plays a joint role
with consent in promissory estoppel adjudication. The requirement
of definite and substantial reliance supports the death-of-contract
Yorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 161-62.
Id. at 167.
142
See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
143
Farber & Matheson, supra note 1, at 912; see also De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E.
807, 809 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.) (The law "strains... to hold men to the honorable
fulfillment of engagements designed to influence in their deepest relations the lives of
others."); Yorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 167 ("Judges respond instead to 'the impulse to
hold men to their promises.' ").
144 Lon L. Fuller & 'William R Perdue,Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages (pts.
1-2), 46 YALE LJ. 52, 70 (1936-37).
145
See Yorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 124 ("If the objective of Section 90 is to protect
reliance, then reasonable reliance alone justifies a remedy.").
146
SeeATAH, supra note 3, at 82. Some contractarians, despite positing the decline of
reliance, curiously also assert that promissory estoppel seeks to "foster trust between economic actors." Farber & Matheson, supra note 1, at 945.
140

141
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scholars' view that the reliance principle is essential to promissory estoppel theory. Contrary to the claims of promise-focused theorists, 47
the survey of state court cases since 1981 indicates that detrimental
reliance remains crucial to a promissory estoppel claim. This finding,
however, represents a Pyrrhic victory for death-of-contract scholars.
Because only those few cases with the strongest showings of reliance
can pass judicial scrutiny, the reliance principle of promissory estoppel does not have the overwhelming impact on contract law that
death-of-contract scholars have ardently declared.
Of course, promise-focused theorists continue to insist that the
requirement of "definite and substantial" reliance is consistent with a
promise-based theory of liability. Substantial reliance provides evidence that there was in fact a promise. 148 Furthermore, substantial
reliance also indicates that reliance was foreseeable. Since the promisor should have reasonably expected to induce reliance, it is likely
that she in fact contemplated reliance and, therefore, considered the
seriousness of her promise. 149 According to promise-focused theorists, courts thus focus on enforcing this seriously considered promise,
rather than on protecting harm resulting from substantial reliance.
This argument, however, is no more plausible than the death-ofcontract scholars' view that the reliance requirement protects people's
reliance interests. The plausibility of both characterizations suggests
that the complex theory of promissory estoppel is not reduceable to a
single unifying principle.
B. Judicial Adherence to Traditional Contract Theory
Contrary to death-of-contract scholars' dire claims, judicial reluctance to extend the reliance principle of promissory estoppel suggests
the persistent strength of the traditional contract theory of bargainedfor exchange. Two pieces of evidence support this thesis. First, the
requirement of a clear and definite promise reflects contract rules regarding the making of a valid offer.150 Under these rules, the offer
must unambiguously state all essential terms so as to indicate a clear
intent to be bound. 151 By requiring a clear and definite promise,
courts are applying similar contract standards for a valid offer to
147
SeeYorio & Thel, supra note 1, at 155-57. Professors Yorio & Thel's assertion rests
primarily on cases cited in § 90 of the second Restatement. These cases pre-date 1981, the
publication date of the second Restatement
148
Id. at 159.

Id. at 162-63.
See SECOND RESrATEMENT, supra note 18, §§ 24-33.
151
SeeJOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LA-v OF
1907); Metzger & Phillips, supra note 27, at 496.
149

150

CONTRACTS

§ 316, 324 (2d ed.

1288

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1263

promissory estoppel claims.' 52 Second, the surveyed cases reveal that
courts generally decline to invoke promissory estoppel to defeat Statute of Frauds requirements. 153 This indicates courts' insistence upon
strict contract formalities.
One explanation for the judicial adherence to contract bargain
theory may be that judges are more comfortable with familiar contract
rules and principles. 15 4 Because judges frequently deal with promises
in the bargain context, they "tend to think in bargain terms, and to try
to assimilate reliance theory to more familiar principles applicable to
the normal bargain situation." 155 Moreover, given Section 90's broad
sweeping language, 15 6 judges instinctively resort to familiar contract
theory in shaping promise-enforcement criteria because that theory is
157
more established and thus provides a greater degree of certainty.
Consequently, in applying promissory estoppel doctrine, judges often
refuse to enforce promises that would have also failed the traditional
contract requirement of a clear and definite offer.' 58 This 'Judicial
intertwining" of promissory estoppel and traditional bargain theory
makes it difficult for promisees to avoid requirements of contract bargain theory simply by invoking promissory estoppel doctrine. 159
Two other factors serve to reinforce courts' dependence on bargain theory. First, since courts typically view promissory estoppel as an
exception to traditional contract theory, they try to determine
whether a bargain has been made before they invoke promissory estoppel theory. 160 Thus, "[a] n orientation to first exhaust the possibilities of bargain might well cushion the impact of events removed...
[from] the making of the promise .... " 16 1 In other words, by virtue of

this process of adjudication, courts allow bargain considerations to
seep into determinations of promissory estoppel liability. Second, the
availability of alternative bargain-related doctrines, such as part per152
See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text; see also Kalevitch, supra note 57, at 677
(concluding that Florida promissory estoppel law requires a definite promise "which might
have been enforced had bargained-for consideration been exchanged for the promise");
Metzger & Phillips, supra note 27, at 496 (discussing a line of promissory estoppel cases
requiring a promise "so definite as to meet traditional contract standards for an offer").
153 Since 1981, courts in California and New York alone have refused to apply promissory estoppel to defeat Statute of Frauds requirements in at least 15 cases. See cases cited
supranotes 126-27. In comparison, the survey of allstate court cases for the same period of
time reveals only six cases establishing promissory estoppel liability despite Statute of
Frauds requirements. See supra note 82.
154 Henderson, supra note 1, at 347.

155

Id.

See supra notes 18, 21-24 and accompanying text.
Henderson, supra note 1, at 352 n.36.
158 See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
159
Henderson, supra note 1, at 353.
160
See, e.g., Hoover Community Hotel Corp. v. Thomson, 213 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Ct. App.
1985); Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 462 N.Y.S.2d 917 (App. Div. 1983).
161
Henderson, supra note 1, at 347 n.20.
156
157
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formance and implied-in-fact contract, also serves to minimize the significance of promissory estoppel and reaffirm bargain analysis. 16 2
Yet another explanation for judicial adherence to traditional bargain theory is that courts place a high value on the functions that contract formalities serve. Courts may believe that consideration theory
serves evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions much more
adequately than promissory estoppel doctrine. Consideration provides evidence of a contract, since the promisee probably would not
have given consideration had the promisor not agreed to a contract.' 63 Consideration also cautions the promisor as to the seriousness of the promise, since mutuality of obligation supposedly places
both parties in a "circumspective frame of mind."' 64 Furthermore,
consideration distinguishes the enforceable promise by virtue of the
65
exchange process.
Promissory estoppel doctrine, on the other hand, does not seem
to serve formal functions as well as consideration theory. Reliance
that a fact-finder deems reasonably foreseeable after the fact is certainly not strong evidence of a clear promise. Nor does it provide
cautionary or channeling safeguards as effectively as consideration. In
fact, Professor Fuller suggests that unbargained-for reliance by itself is
insufficient to satisfy functions of formality. 66 He asserts that one
must determine whether the promise "emerge [d] out of a context of
tacit exchange" and "whether after the promise was made the promisee declared to the promisor his intention of acting on it."167 This
analysis suggests that reliance, in the absence of a "tacit exchange"
and notice to the promisor, would not justify enforcement of a promise, at least on formal grounds. Consequently, courts may find traditional bargain theory of consideration more appealing because it
more effectively serves goals of formality.
CONCLUSION

Although the drafters of the second Restatement intended the new
Sections 90 and 139 to reflect the burgeoning development of promissory estoppel, state court decisions since the publication of the second
Restatement indicate a contraction, rather than expansion, of promissory estoppel (assuming that the doctrine ever had such widespread
practical appeal to begin with). Though judges and scholars, in theory, may recognize promissory estoppel as a sound doctrine, in prac162

Id. at 349 n.27.

163

See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv.799, 800 (1941).

164
165
166
167

Id. at 800, 816.
Id. at 801, 816.
Id. at 819.
Id.
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tice courts show extreme reluctance to deviate from traditional
contract principles. Contrary to assertions that promissory estoppel
has become a primary, independent theory of obligation, the doctrine
has remained an inferior doctrine of last resort. Because promissory
estoppel claims typically come to the fore only after promisees have
exhausted all other possible claims, courts regard such last-ditch attempts at recovery with extreme suspicion. Despite the claims of
death-of-contract scholars, the waning of promissory estoppel provides
evidence of the enduring vitality of traditional bargain theory.
PhuongN. Pham
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Katherine Van Wezel Stone, BA, J.D., Professor of Law
Joseph Straus, Diploma in Law, J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
Barry Strom, B.S.,J.D., Senior Lecturer (Clinical Studies)

Robert S. Summers, B.S., LL.B., William G. McRoberts Research Professor in the Administration of
the Law
Winnie F. Taylor, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
James Justesen White, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
David Wippman, BA., M.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Charles W. Wolfram, A.B., LL.B., Acting Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Charles Frank
Reavis Sr. Professor of Law
Faculty Emeriti
Harry Bitner, A.B., B.S., L.S., J.D., Law Librarian and Professor of Law
W. David Curtiss, A-B., LLB., Professor of Law
W. Tucker Dean, A.B., J.D., M.B.A., Professor of Law
W. Ray Forrester, A.B., J.D., LL.D., Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law
Jane L. Hammond, B.A., M.S. in LS., J.D., Edward Cornell Law Librarian and Professor of Law
Harry G. Henn, A.B., LL.B., J.S.D., Edward Cornell Professor of Law
Milton R. Konvitz, B.S., MA, J.D., Ph.D., Litt.D., D.C.L, LH.D., LL.D., Professor, New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Robert S. Pasley, A.B., LL.B., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law
Rudolf B. Schlesinger, LL.B., Dr. Jur., William Nelson Cromwell Professor of International and
Comparative Law
Gray Thoron, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
Elected Members from Other Faculties
Calum Carmichael, Professor of Comparative Literature and Biblical Studies, College of Arts and
Sciences
James A. Gross, Professor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Paul R. Hyams, Associate Professor of History, College of Arts and Sciences

